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       Scott Dodson 1  Professor
For those of us interested in or practic-
ing in commercial civil litigation, removal of 
a case from state court to federal court is a 
regular event. It also is an important strate-
gic event for defendants because of perceived 
tactical advantages of a federal forum, such as 
the following: (a) a more defendant-friendly 
jury pool; (b) more favorable jury rules;2 (c) 
greater familiarity of defendant’s counsel’s 
with federal court and greater familiarity of 
plaintiff’s counsel with state court;3 and (d) a 
perceived higher cost of federal court that de-
fendants may be able to bear more easily than 
plaintiffs.4
But what happens when a defendant who 
is a citizen of the forum state tries to remove 
on diversity grounds? Section 1441(b) of the 
removal statute prohibits removal in such a 
case under what has come to be known as the 
Forum Defendant Rule. Under this rule, re-
moval to federal court on diversity grounds is 
prohibited if any one of the defendants in the 
action is a citizen of the state in which the ac-
tion was filed.5
The reason for the rule is obvious: the tra-
ditional justification for invocation of federal 
jurisdiction in diversity cases is to provide to 
out-of-state litigants a forum seen as less bi-
1.  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. I thank the students in my Federal Jurisdiction (fall 2006) 
and Civil Procedure (fall 2006) classes for their insights on this issue in class discussion. A more robust discussion of 
the issues in this article focusing generally on the jurisdictional/procedural character of removal will appear in Scott 
Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. u. L. reV. (forthcoming 2008).
2.  Compare feD. r. CiV. P. 48(1) (requiring unanimous jury verdicts) with Ark. r. CiV. P. 48 (“Where as many as 
nine out of twelve jurors in a civil case agree upon a verdict, the verdict shall be returned as the verdict of such jury. 
The parties may, however, stipulate that a jury shall consist of any number less than twelve and that a verdict or 
finding of a stated majority thereof shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.”). 
3.  See 16 JAmes wm. moore, moore’s feDerAL PrACtiCe § 107.04, at 107-25 (3d ed. 2006).
4.  See Gregory M. Cesarano & Daniel R. Vega, So You Thought a Remand was Imminent? Post-Removal Litigation 
and The Waiver of the Right to Seek a Remand Grounded on Removal Defects, 74 fLA. B.J. 22, 23-24 (2000).
5.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
The Forum Defendant Rule in Arkansas
74
ARKANSAS LAW NOTES 2007
ased towards them. The Forum Defendant 
Rule preserves the narrowness of this justi-
fication by prohibiting an in-state defendant 
from invoking federal diversity jurisdiction.
I. The Issue
What is less obvious, however, is whether 
the Forum Defendant Rule is jurisdictional or 
procedural. This is an important question. If 
removal in violation of the Forum Defendant 
Rule never confers subject-matter jurisdic-
tion in the federal district court, the lack of 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time prior 
to final judgment, can be raised by any party 
or the court sua sponte, and is not subject to 
waiver or estoppel.6 In short, if the Forum 
Defendant Rule is jurisdictional, then a case 
removed in violation of the rule must be re-
manded to state court immediately, at any 
time and regardless of the circumstances.
In contrast, if removal in violation of the 
Forum Defendant Rule is not jurisdictional, 
the defect must be raised by the plaintiff 
within thirty days of removal.7 If the defect 
is not raised within that time, the defect is 
waived, and the plaintiff is stuck in federal 
court.8
The question is of critical importance in 
practice. If the rule is procedural, then the 
burden is on the plaintiff to recognize the 
defect within a short time frame. Yet, often, 
a determination of citizenship for diversity 
purposes is far from clear.9 If the defendant 
invokes diversity jurisdiction as a basis for 
removal simply by alleging non-forum citi-
zenship in its removal papers, the plaintiff 
may have no basis for challenging the defen-
dant’s assertion of non-forum citizenship un-
til discovery, well after the thirty day remand 
window for procedural defects has expired.10
6.  See id. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); Ins. Corp. of Ire., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702 (1982) (stating that jurisdictional defects may be raised at any time, by any party or the court sua sponte, and 
irrespective of waiver or estoppel).
7.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal . . . .”).
8.  See Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339, 344 (1913) (holding that a defect in removal procedure 
can be waived). 
9.  For example, a corporation is a citizen of its state of principal place of business, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), a 
determination that is often difficult to make, compare, e.g., Kelly v. U.S. Steel Co., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960) (using the 
“muscle test” to determine principal place of business citizenship), with Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 
F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (using the “nerve center test” to determine principal place of business citizenship), with 
Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1992) (using a “total activity test”). Often, the very determination 
of whether an organizational defendant is a corporation or a partnership is itself a question requiring extensive 
discovery. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 126 S. Ct. 606, 612 & n.4 (2005) (acknowledging as “understandable” 
the plaintiffs’ confusion about a real estate defendant’s organizational status). 
10.  This is precisely what occurred in Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006), discussed 
below.
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II. The Circuit Split
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are split over 
whether the Forum Defendant Rule is proce-
dural or jurisdictional. At least seven circuits 
have characterized the rule as procedural.11 
The most recent is the Ninth Circuit, in Lively 
v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc.12
11.  See Farm Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Fudge, 831 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1987); Woodward v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 428 F.2d 
880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.); Korea Exch. Bank v. Trackwise Sales Corp., 66 F.3d 46, 48-51 (3d Cir. 1995); 
In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518, 1523 (5th Cir. 1991); Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus. Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 380 (7th Cir. 
2000); Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006); Am. Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1095 
(10th Cir. 1970).
I say “at least” seven because two other circuits, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, appear to follow the procedural 
characterization as well, but the existence of contrary authority within the respective circuit makes this conclusion 
uncertain.
The Sixth Circuit, in Handley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1924), seemed clearly to 
articulate a procedural, waivable characterization of the forum defendant rule. Handley-Mack, 2 F.2d at 437 (“[W]
e find no holding of the Supreme Court that a removal by a nonresident defendant . . . is vital to the jurisdiction 
of the District Court to hear the case, in the sense that the court has no discretion but to remand it, in spite of the 
original jurisdiction to hear it and long-continued acquiescence by the parties, as well as the court’s trial and decision 
thereunder.”). However, courts in the Sixth Circuit have declined to cite Handley-Mack in subsequent, unpublished 
opinions, and have, with one exception, reached the contrary conclusion in them. See Dellinger v. Atlas Techs., Inc., 
9 F.3d 107, No. 92-2091, 1993 WL 43648, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 1993) (holding the forum defendant rule to be 
jurisdictional and controlling even though the plaintiff did not raise it in his remand motion or on appeal); Lindsey 
v. Ky. Med. Investors, Ltd., No. Civ.A.05-116-DLB, 2005 WL 2281607, at *2 & n.3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2005) (raising 
the issue sua sponte because the Rule’s “application impacts the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction” and remanding 
the case because of the defect); Gilbert v. Choo-Choo Partners II, LLC, No. 1:05-CV-99, 2005 WL 1719907, at *2 (E.D. 
Tenn. July 22, 2005) (characterizing a removal in violation of the forum defendant rule as a “lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction”). But see Plastic Moldings Corp. v. Park Sherman Co., 606 F.2d 117, 119 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979) (“The case 
was not properly removable because the removing defendant . . . is a resident of the state in which the action was 
brought . . . . However, the case was within the District Court’s original [diversity] jurisdiction . . . , and Plastic 
Moldings’ acquiescence in the removal waived any objection it might have had in this regard.”).
The Eleventh Circuit, in Borg-Warner Leasing v. Doyle Electric Co., 733 F.2d 833 (11th Cir. 1984), held that 
removal in violation of the forum defendant rule “was a technical flaw that did not go to the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the court. Because Borg-Warner’s action fell within the original diversity jurisdiction of the federal district court, 
the procedural defect under the removal statute was waivable by the parties. . . . We conclude that waiver occurred 
since this case proceeded without objection to consideration on the merits.” Borg-Warner, 733 F.2d at 834 n.2. In 1998, 
the Eleventh Circuit again addressed the forum defendant rule, but in a confusing footnote, characterized it both as 
waivable and as jurisdictional: “First, that removal of a case with resident defendants is a procedural defect does not 
render that defect meaningless; rather, the defect is waivable, and in this case the plaintiffs have not waived their 
objection . . . . Second, [in considering whether to remand because of this defect or dismiss under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens,] . . . . [i]mportant jurisdictional questions cannot be ignored merely because they are difficult. To do 
otherwise would allow defendants to evade the statutory requirements of § 1441(b) and allow federal courts to make 
significant dispositive rulings in a case over which the federal courts may lack jurisdiction.” Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T 
Co., 139 F.3d 1168, 1372 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998). Finally, in 1999, the Eleventh Circuit, in dicta developed in the course of 
discussing the legislative history of the removal statute, intimated that Congress meant to subsume § 1441(b) defects 
under the non-jurisdictional language of § 1447(c). See Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999). 
It is no wonder that district courts within the Eleventh Circuit are split on the question. Compare Elias v. The Am. 
Nat’l Red Cross, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (holding the rule jurisdictional), with Murphy v. Aventis 
Pasteur, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (holding the rule non-jurisdictional).
The Fourth Circuit has not confronted the issue, but district courts within that circuit have uniformly considered the 
rule to be non-jurisdictional. See Ada Liss Group v. Sara Lee Branded Apparel, No. 1:06CV610, 2007 WL 634083, at *4 
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 2007) (holding “that the forum defendant rule is procedural rather than jurisdictional”); Sherman 
v. Sigma Alpha Mu Fraternity, 128 F. Supp. 2d 842, 846 (D. Md. 2001) (considering the defect to be discretionary, not 
jurisdictional); Ravens Metal Prods., Inc. v. Wilson, 816 F. Supp. 427, 429 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (“The defect at issue in 
the present action does not affect the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court. That Defendant is a citizen 
of the forum state is a procedural defect in removal Plaintiff has waived by failing to object within the 30-day period 
prescribed by § 1447(c).”).
12.  456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006).
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A. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach: 
 Lively v. Wild Oats Markets
Lively filed a personal injury action against 
Wild Oats in California state court seeking 
damages for a slip and fall accident that oc-
curred in one of Wild Oats’ California stores.13 
Wild Oats removed on the basis of diversity, 
ostensibly under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),14 be-
cause Lively was a citizen of New York and 
Wild Oats was incorporated in Delaware with, 
according to its removal papers, its principal 
place of business in Colorado.15
Federal court was preferable to Wild 
Oats and detrimental to Lively for a num-
ber of reasons. First, California requires only 
a three-fourths jury majority for a verdict, 
whereas the federal rules require unanimi-
ty.16 Second, the district jury pool was likely 
to be more business-friendly than the coun-
ty pool.17 Other strategic reasons may have 
animated Lively’s decision to file in state, as 
opposed to federal, court.18 Lively, however, 
having no reason to doubt the Wild Oats’ 
claims of its own citizenship (and no evidence 
on which to base any doubt), did not object 
to the removal,19 and the case proceeded to 
discovery.
During discovery, the district court de-
termined that Wild Oats’ principal place of 
business was California, not Colorado.20 It 
therefore held a show cause hearing to deter-
mine whether removal was improper under 
the Forum Defendant Rule of § 1441(b).21 By 
this time, however, the thirty day window for 
remand for procedural defects had expired, 
and thus remand was only available for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.22 Wild Oats ar-
gued that the Forum Defendant Rule was pro-
cedural, rather than jurisdictional, and thus 
could only have been the basis for a remand 
by motion within thirty days of removal.23 
The district court disagreed and remanded 
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.24
The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding 
that the Forum Defendant Rule is procedur-
al on three grounds.25 First, the court deter-
mined that the legislative history of § 1447(c) 
supported its procedural character.26 Section 
13.  Id. at 936.
14.  I say “ostensibly” because Wild Oats referred to § 1441(b) in its removal papers even though § 1441(b) does not 
grant authority for removal based on diversity. Id.
15.  Id.
16.  Appellee’s Response, Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., Case No. 04-56682, at 3.
17.  Id. at 3.
18.  See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.





24.  Id. at 937.
25.  The Ninth Circuit also concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order under § 
1447(d). Id. at 937-38.
26.  Id. at 939.
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1447(c) characterizes various defects of re-
moval. As originally written, the statute pro-
vided that remand must be made at any time 
if the case was “removed improvidently and 
without jurisdiction.”27 In 1988, Congress 
changed that language to provide that “any 
defect in removal procedure” must be made 
within thirty days of removal, but that re-
mand must be made at any time if the court 
“lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”28 Finally, 
in 1996, Congress adopted the current lan-
guage, which provides for remand only with-
in thirty days of removal for “any defect other 
than lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”29 
The Ninth Circuit, surveying these transfor-
mations, concluded that Congress’s substitu-
tion of “defect other than lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction” for “defect in removal proce-
dure” represented a narrowing of defects that 
should be considered “jurisdictional.”30 The 
court concluded that that narrowing excluded 
the Forum Defendant Rule from the jurisdic-
tional realm, though it did not explain why.31
The Ninth Circuit’s legislative history ar-
gument merely begs the question. It is true 
that § 1447(c)’s iterations demonstrate an at-
tempt to broaden the category of non-juris-
dictional defects subject to its thirty-day re-
mand window, but it does not and has never 
attempted to define which defects are juris-
dictional and which are not.32 The conclusion 
of the Ninth Circuit, that the broadening of 
the non-jurisdictional category encompassed 
the forum defendant rule, does not logically 
follow from the changes of § 1447(c) unless 
the forum defendant rule was seen as non-
jurisdictional in the first place, the very ques-
tion presented.33
Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
a procedural characterization of the Forum 
Defendant Rule comported with the Rule’s 
purpose.34 The court noted that removal based 
on diversity jurisdiction is intended to protect 
out-of-state defendants from possible preju-
dices in state court, and that the need for this 
protection is absent when the removing de-
fendant is in-state.35 The court reasoned that 
a procedural characterization of the Forum 
Defendant Rule would return to the plain-
tiff the ultimate choice of forum because the 
plaintiff could either move to remand to state 
court (within the 30-day window) or choose to 
stay in federal court by not moving to remand 
within the thirty days.36 By contrast, reasoned 
the Ninth Circuit, a jurisdictional character-
ization of the Forum Defendant Rule would 
allow the court to remand the case to state 
court even if the plaintiff preferred to remain 
in federal court.37 
This argument seems backwards. Even 
assuming that the purpose of the forum de-
fendant rule is to protect the plaintiff’s pre-
ferred choice of forum, a jurisdictional char-
acterization promotes this purpose far more 
than a procedural characterization. A juris-
dictional rule would require remand back to 
27.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1948).
28.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1988).
29.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1996).
30.  Lively, 456 F.3d at 939.
31.  Id.
32.  See Dodson, supra note 1.
33.  See id.
34.  Lively, 456 F.3d at 939.
35.  Id. at 940.
36.  Id.
37.  Id.
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the plaintiff’s preferred forum in all cases, 
whereas a procedural rule would require re-
mand only if the plaintiff timely moved for 
remand within thirty days of removal.38 True, 
as the Ninth Circuit pointed out, a jurisdic-
tional characterization will require remand 
even if the plaintiff prefers federal court, but 
it seems extremely unlikely that a plaintiff, 
having initially chosen state court over fed-
eral court, would later prefer to litigate in the 
defendant’s choice of forum.39
Third, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the 
fact that eight other circuit courts had held 
similarly.40 It also relied upon a Supreme 
Court case, Grubbs v. General Electric Credit 
Corp.,41 which held that where a removed 
case is tried on the merits without objection 
and the federal court enters judgment, the 
jurisdictional issue on appeal is not whether 
removal was proper, but whether the district 
court would have had original jurisdiction 
over the case.42 The Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that the Supreme Court’s comment that the 
defect could not be raised after judgment, 
contrary to most defects of subject matter ju-
risdiction, suggested that the Supreme Court 
considered removal defects to be procedural, 
not jurisdictional.43 
Grubbs, however, is irrelevant, though the 
Ninth Circuit’s confusion is understandable. 
Grubbs dealt with two separate defects and 
stands for two separate propositions regard-
ing them, neither of which have to do with 
the process of characterizing rules as juris-
dictional or procedural: (1) a jurisdictional 
defect will not void a judgment if it is “cured,” 
i.e., the court obtains jurisdiction, by the time 
it enters judgment; and (2) nonjurisdictional 
defects can be overcome by countervailing 
prudential considerations such as economy, 
efficiency, and finality.44 In line with these 
two positions, the Court has reaffirmed that 
“if, at the end of the day and case, a jurisdic-
tional defect remains uncured, the judgment 
must be vacated.”45 Thus, the fact that a non-
jurisdictional defect could not be raised for 
the first time on appeal is an unremarkable 
statement. It does not answer the question of 
whether the forum defendant rule should be 
characterized as jurisdictional or procedur-
al.46
38.  See Dodson, supra note 1.
39.  See id.
40.  Lively, 456 F.3d at 940.
41.  405 U.S. 699 (1972).
42.  Id. at 702.
43.  Lively, 456 F.3d at 941-42.
44.  See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 573-74 (2004) (stating that dismissal of the 
defendant cured the jurisdictional defect, and that the statutory defect of failing to comply with the time of removal 
rules was overridden—rather than cured—by prudential considerations); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 73 
(1996) (“The jurisdictional defect was cured, i.e., complete diversity was established before the trial commenced. . . . 
[What remained was] a statutory flaw—[the] failure to meet the § 1441(a) requirement that the case be fit for federal 
adjudication at the time the removal petition is filed.” (emphasis in original)).
45.  Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 76-77 (emphasis omitted).
46.  See Dodson, supra note 1.
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B. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach: 
 Hurt v. Dow Chemical
Standing alone against the tide of circuit 
courts is the Eighth Circuit. In Hurt v. Dow 
Chemical Co.,47 then Chief Judge Richard 
Arnold held that the Forum Defendant Rule 
is a jurisdictional defect that can be raised 
at any time by any party. There, Hurt, an 
Illinois citizen, filed suit in Missouri state 
court against Dow Chemical, a citizen of 
Delaware, and Rose Exterminator, a citizen 
of Missouri, for personal injuries resulting 
from exposure to the pesticide Dursban.48 
Dow manufactured the pesticide, and Rose 
applied it to Hurt’s workplace.49 Hurt claimed 
that both defendants were liable for failing to 
warn her, and that Rose was additionally li-
able for failing to use ordinary care in apply-
ing the pesticide.50
The defendants removed, claiming both 
federal question and diversity jurisdiction.51 
Hurt filed an amended complaint in feder-
al court but then moved to remand to state 
court, asserting that the case had been im-
properly removed.52 The district court denied 
the motion, holding removal on both grounds 
was proper and that Hurt had waived any 
non-jurisdictional objection.53 Hurt appealed.
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remand-
ed. The court first held that federal question 
jurisdiction was lacking.54 It then addressed 
the diversity issue. The court noted that be-
cause complete diversity existed among the 
parties, Hurt could have filed the case in fed-
eral court under the court’s original jurisdic-
tion of § 1332.55 Here, however, Hurt did not 
invoke the original jurisdiction of the federal 
courts; rather, the defendants invoked feder-
al jurisdiction through removal.56
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts, both original 
and removal, is entirely a creature of statute. 
If one of the statutory requirements is not met, 
the district court lacks jurisdiction.57 Because 
removal was precluded here by § 1441(b), the 
Eighth Circuit concluded, the district court 
lacked removal jurisdiction and should have 
granted the remand motion.58
Hurt’s resort to formalism does not jive 
well with its own precedent, for longstanding 
Eighth Circuit caselaw holds the 30-day time 
requirement for removal to be a nonjurisdic-
tional procedural bar.59 If Hurt’s formalistic 
47.  963 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1992).




52.  Id. at 1143-44.
53.  Id. at 1144.
54.  Id. at 1144-45.
55.  Id. at 1145.
56.  Id.
57.  Id.
58.  Id. Hurt did not make the textual argument that § 1441(b) is an exception to the jurisdictional grant in § 1441(a) 
and therefore is likely a jurisdictional provision rather than a procedural one. See Brian W. Portugal, Comment, More 
than a Legal Nicety: Why the Forum Defendant Rule of 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(b) is Jurisdictional, 56 BAYLor L. reV. 
1019, 1034-36 (2004).
59.  See, e.g., Koehnen v. Herald Fire Ins. Co., 89 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 1996); Nolan v. Prime Tanning Co., 871 F.2d 
76, 78 (8th Cir. 1989).
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syllogism is to hold water on its own, it must 
also deem the time bar to removal to be ju-
risdictional. Hurt’s unwillingness to explain 
formal justifications for the differences or 
to adopt a more functional approach under-
mines Hurt’s persuasiveness.60
Nevertheless, just last year the Eighth 
Circuit reaffirmed Hurt in Horton v. Conklin,61 
in which three new judges noted the contrary 
views of the other circuits but nevertheless 
adhered to Hurt as “the better rule.”62 Thus, 
even after the statutory amendments in 
1996, which, according to at least one court, 
resolved the split,63 the Eighth Circuit con-
tinues to characterize the Forum Defendant 
Rule as jurisdictional.
C. The Potential for Resolution of 
 the Circuit Split
Three events could resolve this split, 
though each is doubtful. First, the Eighth 
Circuit, recognizing the trend of its sister cir-
cuits, could reconsider the result in Hurt. That 
event seems unlikely because only the court 
sitting en banc, and not just a subsequent 
panel, can overrule prior Eighth Circuit pan-
el decisions.64 It seems particularly unlikely 
now because the Eighth Circuit voted not to 
rehear en banc Horton v. Conklin, the case 
reaffirming Hurt.65
Second, Congress could amend § 1441(b) 
to clarify that the Forum Defendant Rule is 
not a jurisdictional provision. To my knowl-
edge, that event is not imminent.
Third, the Supreme Court could resolve 
the circuit split. Although the Court has rec-
ognized that it has not decided the question,66 
simple mathematics suggest that the likeli-
hood of the Court granting review in any case 
is small,67 and the likelihood that the Court 
will grant certiorari to hear a case involving 
this issue is particularly unlikely because 
the Court recently declined to review both 
Horton68 and Lively.69
III.  The Future for Arkansas Attorneys
 and Courts
Thus, for now, the law in Arkansas feder-
al courts is clear under Hurt and Horton: the 
Forum Defendant Rule is a jurisdictional re-
quirement that, if violated, requires remand 
whenever it is raised.
60.  See Dodson, supra note 1.
61.  431 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 2005).
62.  Id. at 605.
63.  See Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999); cf. Lively, 456 F.3d at 939 (relying on the 
legislative changes as one basis for holding the rule to be non-jurisdictional).
64.  See United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir.1997); Campbell v. Purkett, 957 F.2d 535, 536 (8th Cir.1992) 
(per curiam).
65.  Horton, 431 F.3d 602, reh’g & reh’g en banc den. (8th Cir. Feb. 9, 2006).
66.  See Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81 n.6 (2005) (recognizing that the Court has not resolved the issue).
67.  The Supreme Court granted review in only 63 of the 1671 cases docketed in the 2005-06 Term, under 4%. See 
Bureau of National Affairs, United States Law Week’s Supreme Court Today, 2005-2006 Term in Review 01, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3016 (2006), available at http://ippubs.bna.com/ip/bna/lwt.nsf/8525640a0057f2b0852563930058d16c/f999c7
d96a74b8b8852571c40050df4e?OpenDocument.
68.  See Waugh v. Horton, ___U.S. ___, No. 05-1419, 2006 WL 1268712 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2006) (denying certiorari).
69.  See Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, No. 06-748, 2007 WL 506065 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2007) (denying 
certiorari). In the interests of full disclosure, I was one of the attorneys assisting Ms. Lively on her petition for 
certiorari, along with Jeff Fisher and Pam Karlan of the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Amy 
Howe of Howe & Russell, P.C., and Lenny Tavera of Lowle, Denison, Smith & Tavera, LLP.
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Arkansas attorneys should consider care-
fully the jurisdictional nature of the Forum 
Defendant Rule in cases removed from 
Arkansas state court to federal court. As a 
practical matter, the jurisdictional nature of 
the rule means that plaintiffs need not fear 
the thirty-day remand requirement for pro-
cedural defects under § 1447(c). Accordingly, 
those who do not wish to be in federal court 
may wish to seek broad discovery relevant to 
the basis for diversity jurisdiction invoked by 
the defendants.
On the flip side, attorneys for defendants 
must recognize that the citizenship of their 
clients may be subject to greater scrutiny in 
discovery. However, a defendant may wish to 
raise the jurisdictional issue itself if it deter-
mines at a later date that its true principal 
place of business is in Arkansas.
In addition to litigants, federal district 
courts in Arkansas must maintain vigilance 
over their subject-matter jurisdiction in re-
moved cases. Because the Eighth Circuit has 
held the Forum Defendant Rule to be juris-
dictional, federal district courts in Arkansas 
may wish to hold a hearing on the citizenship 
of the defendant if at any point in a removed 
proceeding the court believes that a defen-
dant is actually a citizen of Arkansas.
Conclusion
In sum, the Forum Defendant Rule, juris-
dictional in the Eighth Circuit, holds unique 
incentives and pressures for litigants in a 
case removed to Arkansas federal court. Both 
litigants and federal district courts should 
be vigilant in recognizing the unique issues 
raised by the forum defendant rule so that 
tardy invocation of the rule, leading to un-
fairness and wasted time and resources, does 
not occur. 
